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1 Hasten slowly
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
have been tremendously successful in galvanising
political leaders, civil society organisations,
private sector actors, the media and donors, in the
pursuit of human development. The architects of
the MDGs never expected their support to spread
so broad and so wide. As their deadline draws
closer, calls for preparing the post-2015 period are
being made with greater frequency and renewed
urgency. Several actors are determined to shape
the new framework and believe that early
proposals will make most impact.
It would be ill-advised, however, to rush towards
a new set of Targets for the post-2015 era. A
considerable amount of work is required
beforehand. It would be a grave mistake to take
for granted the continued support for the
current set of Goals and Targets beyond 2015
without responding to the many concerns and
criticism voiced by several stakeholders,
observers and analysts. They are valid and must
be addressed. The worst option would be to
simply keep the same MDGs and set new Targets
with a new timeline.
The intergovernmental process for preparing the
post-2015 period should not be intermingled with
the review of progress in 2010. That review
should focus on global progress towards global
Targets. Regarding the post-2015 Targets, a UN
panel of Eminent Persons should be established
to prepare a set of intelligent and feasible
options and suggestions. The panel’s work would
inform the intergovernmental debate about the
post-2015 framework that would kick off in 2012.
Apart from its regional and gender balance, the
panel should include representatives from the
worlds of policymaking, academia, development
practice, civil society and the media.
By taking a ‘big tent’ approach, the panel’s
consultations would yield a range of options and
possibilities that capture the views of a wide
array of stakeholders. The process must be led by
the stakeholders from developing countries; not
by those from donor countries as is usually the
case. Collins (2005: 24), a best-selling author on
leadership, writes:
… those who fund the social sectors can bring
an assumption of ‘fair exchange’ that is highly
dysfunctional: if we give you money, we are
entitled to tell you how to use that money.1
The degree of donorship must be reduced if the
successor Targets to the MDGs are to emerge
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from a genuine partnership among equals.
Compared with trade and other financial flows,
foreign aid is something of an overblown sideshow.
The international development agenda is often
dominated by donor-centric perceptions of reality.
Huxley (1955) wrote:
Knowledge is acquired when we succeed in
fitting a new experience into the system of
concepts based upon old experiences.
Understanding comes when we liberate
ourselves from the old and so make possible a
direct, unmediated contact with the new.
The aim of this article is to help alter the outlook
of the MDGs from knowledge to understanding.
2 Unconventional wisdom
The MDGs have been misinterpreted, misused
and misappropriated. Misinterpreted as national
Targets; misused as a donor-centric view of
development; and misappropriated as a call for
faster growth or for more aid. Indeed, the MDGs
have been misconstrued and distorted by
different groups to suit their own purpose.
A recent paper of the Center for Global
Development exemplifies some of these points.
Severino and Ray (2009: 10) state that:
By aiming for targets [i.e. the MDGs] that are
out of reach from the neediest countries’
public authorities, the ‘international
community’ (i.e. donor nations) has therefore
accepted to substitute itself to some states in
the provision of basic social services through
long-term financial transfers.
The perception is widespread that unless all
countries achieve the same global Targets, the
world will not meet them. This view is incorrect.
The MDGs are to be achieved collectively, not
necessarily individually. The MDGs are global
Targets; they do not need to be achieved in each
and every country.
The misinterpretation of the MDGs as one-size-
fits-all Targets has set the bar for sub-Saharan
African countries unrealistically high. This has
reinforced the perception of Afro-pessimism
among development practitioners, policymakers
and in the media. It begs the question whether
Africa is missing the Targets or whether the
world is missing the point. It is regrettable that
some quarters use the MDGs to depict Africa as
a failure so as to gain support for a particular
agenda or argument.
Furthermore, the MDGs express ends of
development; not means. They never aimed to
prescribe a particular development strategy or
policy framework. Yet, several quarters have
tried to misappropriate the MDGs to gain
support for their specific agenda – especially for
faster economic growth and for more aid.
Bourguignon et al. (2008: 23), for instance,
conclude:
… most developing countries were lagging
behind […]. In middle-income countries, and
in those countries with fast growth, filling
these gaps may be essentially a question of
implementing the adequate MDG-oriented
policies. In other countries, accelerating
growth and generating budget resources may
be as important as MDG policies themselves.
From that point of view, the focus of the
international development community on
Sub-Saharan Africa is fully justified.
It is not the first time that international Goals
are misappropriated. In 2000, a joint publication
by the United Nations, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank reviewed progress towards the
seven international development Goals that had
been adopted by the OECD Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1996. Civil
society organisations quickly rebranded the
booklet from A Better World for All to Bretton Woods
for All because they understood that a certain
agenda had misappropriated the international
Goals. The sections that summarised global
progress on each of the seven Goals were not
problematic; it was the closing section entitled
‘What it will take to achieve the goals’ that was
unacceptable. Similarly, Kanbur (2009: 4) shows
how the original set of reforms that Williamson
coined as the ‘Washington Consensus’ was
distorted to represent ‘one side of an ideological
divide which structured much of the
development discourse in the 1990s’.
‘Evidence-based’ policymaking has recently
emerged as jargon in the development debate
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(Davies 2004). It merits a pause to reflect on its
meaning. Does it mean that in the past, policies
were made by people who were driven by
emotions or beliefs and solely motivated by self-
interest? Does it mean that policies are now
made by rational and enlightened leaders; people
who are no longer influenced by experience,
context, politics or self-interest?
‘Neuroeconomists’2 understand that human
beings wear lenses that colour their perception
and interpretation of reality. It would be naive to
think that such lenses no longer exist. It is a
fallacy to pretend that there is a single way of
perceiving and interpreting reality. Hence,
evidence-based policymaking can be a
euphemism for misappropriating the policy
debate by imposing a certain worldview on
everyone else. Moreover, the argument that
politics can be taken out of the process of
policymaking is inconsistent with the promotion
of multi-party democracy in developing and
transition countries.
Having an ideology or believing in a particular
theory is not dangerous. What is dangerous and
potentially deceptive is to pretend not to be
influenced by a particular theory or ideology,
while hiding behind the false neutrality of so-
called ‘evidence-based’ analysis. It is utopian to
pretend that politics no longer matter; that
policymaking can be based on rational analyses
and an objective interpretation of reality.
The Commission on the Social Determinants of
Health puts it as follows:
Traditional hierarchies of evidence (which put
randomized controlled trials and laboratory
experiments at the top) generally do not work
for research on the social determinants of
health. Rather, evidence needs to be judged on
fitness for purpose – that is, does it
convincingly answer the question asked.
Evidence is only one part of what swings policy
decisions. (WHO 2008: 34)
The call for evidence-based policymaking is often
accompanied by an emphasis on quantitative
analysis. Statistics, however, have been used
before to promote a particular theory or ideology.
It was a mathematician turned philosopher who
coined the term ‘misplaced concreteness’.
Whitehead (1925) argued that concepts such as
aggregates and averages facilitate the
comprehension of reality in all its complexity.
However, one can easily forget that aggregates
and averages are concepts that exist only in the
human mind; they do not exist in reality.
Misplaced concreteness is to pretend that one is
dealing with concrete persons or situations when,
in fact, one deals with abstractions of reality. The
danger of misplaced concreteness occurs when
conclusions are drawn based on deductions from
such abstractions, while believing that they are
based on observations of concrete realities. Then,
misplaced concreteness becomes an obstacle to
gaining understanding over knowledge.
A case of misplaced concreteness unfolded in
Kenya in the early 1980s. It was the era of
structural adjustment when user fees for public
utilities and basic social services were introduced
around the world. Kenya was considering fees at
public water points. The economists at the
Ministry of Finance (including several foreign
advisers) set about to develop an appropriate
scheme. Some raised concerns about its impact
on poor people. After lengthy discussions, it was
agreed to introduce the water fee only in those
districts where the average household income
exceeded a certain threshold. When the
utilisation rate of public water points dropped
dramatically in the wake of the fee introduction,
the economists in Nairobi were baffled. How
could a small nominal fee have such a large
impact? Their data showed that the average
household income was more than adequate to
cover this small expense. They failed to
understand that the average household income
was an abstraction of reality. It did not have any
practical meaning to most women who had to pay
the water fee. To them, the concept of an average
household income did not correspond with the
daily reality they faced, whereas the payment of
the water fee represented a very concrete reality.
3 Six areas of concern
Before taking the MDGs beyond 2015, several
aspects of their current formulation need to be
examined and modified. They include:
(a) reshaping the structure of the Goals and
Targets; (b) including new quantitative Targets;
(c) interpreting global Targets as collective ones;
(d) carefully choosing the type of benchmarks;
(e) fixing a new time horizon; and (f) monitoring
beyond the national average.
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(a) New structure
The current set of MDGs has three health-
related Goals (i.e. child mortality, maternal
health, infectious diseases). They could be
collapsed into one overall health Goal, thereby
making space for the inclusion of other areas of
concern. The current set of MDGs also includes
two overlapping Targets, i.e. countries that
achieve universal primary education
automatically comply with the Target on gender
equality in basic education. Such overlaps are
unnecessary and ultimately unfair. Several
observers have also criticised the poor coverage
of gender equality and of environmental
sustainability in the current set of MDGs.
(b) New Targets
The natural tendency is to add more Goals and
new Targets. Candidates range from climate
change to secondary education, quality of
education, human rights, infrastructure, economic
growth, good governance, security and others. But
by adding more Targets, one diminishes the
capacity of the MDGs to be understood intuitively
and communicated easily with the general public.
The number of Goals and Targets must be kept to
a minimum. No matter their number, a set of
Targets can never cover the many dimensions of
human development in an adequate manner. Any
belief in the perfectibility of the MDGs would be
illusory. The MDGs were not conceived as a
comprehensive or near-perfect expression of the
complexity of human development. Rather, they
offer a version of it that can easily be understood
by a general audience. Most stakeholders value
this branding and agree that it deserves to be
protected. The MDGs have caught on so well
because of their concise and measurable nature.
Therefore, defining the content of the post-2015
set will demand tough choices. A strong but fair
gatekeeper will be called for; because ‘less is
more’.
(c) Collective nature of global Targets
Global Targets apply at the global level.
Unfortunately, the global MDG canon has turned
them into yardsticks for measuring and judging
performance at the national level. In doing so,
the MDG debate suffers from misplaced
concreteness. Their interpretation as one-size-
fits-all Targets abstracts away the historical
background of each country as well as her
political system, natural endowment, geography,
internal divisions and other challenges. The post-
2015 Targets must guard against the
misconception that global Targets automatically
serve as national Targets.
(d) Type of benchmarks
Performance can be measured according to
absolute or relative benchmarks. Both are valid
but none gives a complete picture. Most MDGs
are expressed in relative terms, e.g. reducing
poverty by half; cutting infant mortality by two-
thirds; slashing maternal mortality by three-
quarters. Since proportional changes tend to be
inversely related to the initial situation, the
misinterpretation of the MDGs as one-size-fits-
all Targets puts the least developed and the low-
income countries at a disadvantage
(Vandemoortele 2009). This has led to a form of
unconcealed discrimination of countries with low
levels of human development. Global Goals and
Targets have earlier been expressed in either
absolute terms or as combined relative and
absolute benchmarks. The post-2015 Goals and
Targets will have to consider the implications of
selecting a particular type of benchmark.
(e) New time horizon
An important detail that has been overlooked by
many observers is that the Millennium
Declaration (UN 2000) does not spell out the
period over which the numerical Targets have to
be achieved. It mentions the deadline year (mostly
2015) but relative benchmarks need a base year
too. Since the world leaders could not agree on
this, they concealed their disagreement by
remaining silent about the period. The architects
of the MDGs decided to take 1990 as the baseline
year, based on historical trends at the global level.
But as the MDGs came into being in 2001, there
has been confusion as to whether they are to be
achieved between 2000 and 2015 or over the period
1990–2015. The post-2015 Targets will need to be
clear about the baseline year and the period over
which they are to be achieved. They will have to
weigh the pros and cons of short- versus long-term
Targets. Whereas most dimensions of human
development do not change significantly over the
short-term, long-term Targets suffer from weak
political accountability, because their deadline will
not occur on the watch of the current
governments. Intermediate Targets can
compensate for this disadvantage (Vandemoortele
2008). Finally, the selection of the time horizon
will need to take into account the usual three–five
year time lag in obtaining global statistics.
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(f) Disaggregated monitoring
The world will not meet the MDGs largely
because disparities within the majority of
countries have grown to the point of slowing
down national progress. Monitoring must bring
this to the fore. The MDG Indicator for
measuring equity – i.e. the ‘share of the poorest
quintile in national consumption’ – covers it only
partially. Moreover, it is seldom mentioned in the
many MDG monitoring reports. The growing
availability of disaggregated data makes it
possible to adjust key national statistics for
equity. Given its critical importance for achieving
the MDGs and for realising pro-poor growth, the
remainder of the article presents a concrete
proposal for moving forward on disaggregated
monitoring.
4 Equity-adjusted national statistics
Measurement matters because it influences
action. When the nature and extent of poverty
are unknown, it is unlikely that society will take
strong action to reduce it. The same applies for
equity. Societies measure things that are
considered important. If something is not
counted, it typically means that it does not count.
Since a separate Indicator for equity proved
insufficient to bring disparities to the fore, our
proposal seeks to embed equity within existing
Indicators. It is illustrated at the hand of quintile-
specific data on under-five mortality rate (U5MR),
which is among the more robust MDG Indicators.
Different groups in society have typically
different levels of social and economic wellbeing.
Data confirm that social Indicators vary
considerably across groups within countries.
Thus, national statistics do not only reveal; they
also conceal. Some call it the ‘fallacy of the
mean’; others put it more strongly as the
‘tyranny of averages’.
Recent surveys – especially the Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS) – provide disaggregated
data. They have generated information by wealth
quintile (i.e. one-fifth of the population) for
numerous countries. The grouping of households
is not based on income or consumption, which
are notoriously difficult to measure. Instead, it is
based on household assets that can be readily
observed – such as the possession of a bicycle or a
radio, electricity or water connections, the size
and the type of construction materials of the
dwelling (Filmer and Pritchett 2001).
4.1 Patterns of disparities
Data for most countries indicate a consistent
association between household wealth and the
level of human development. The U5MR
declines steadily across quintiles; but according
to different patterns. In Figure 1, the gradient
for Bolivia, for instance, is steeper than for
Namibia. Although both countries have a similar
national U5MR value, the degree of
representativeness of the national statistic is
considerably less in the former than in the latter.
The children in the bottom quintile in Bolivia
are considerably worse off than the national
U5MR statistic suggests. Children in the top
quintile in Bolivia, on the other hand, face a
much smaller risk of premature death than their
counterparts in Namibia.
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Figure 1 U5MR by quintile in selected countries
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The Democratic Republic of Congo displays a
typical pattern of many of the least developed
countries, namely a moderate gradient across
the lowest four quintiles with a sharp drop for
the top quintile. Jordan, on the other hand,
shows an egalitarian pattern.
In short, there are different patterns to
distribute a national progress across the
population. At one extreme, it can be limited to
improvements for the better-off people, i.e.
through a low-equity approach. At the other
extreme, progress can be driven by ameliorations
in the situation of the worse-off people, i.e.
through a high-equity scenario. Several
combinations lie in between.
4.2 Proposed method
Adjusting a national statistic for disparities can
be done by weighing the quintile-specific values
in a way that accords priority to progress for the
lower quintiles. According to standard practice,
the national average gives equal weights to all
quintiles.3 Table 1 proposes weights that accord a
higher priority to the lower quintiles.
It is not unreasonable to give the bottom quintile
a 30 per cent weight and the top quintile a 10 per
cent weight, implying that progress for the
lowest quintile accounts for three times more
than the same progress made for the highest
quintile. Other quintiles receive intermediate
weights on a sliding scale, so that they add up to
100 per cent.
Take a country with an average U5MR value of
100 per 1,000 live births that is characterised by
a moderate gradient across quintiles, as depicted
under the baseline scenario in Figure 2. Assume
that the country manages to reduce her national
U5MR from 100 to 70. Figure 2 depicts three
possible scenarios. First, the low-equity scenario
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Table 1 Quintile-specific weights
Quintile Un-adjusted weight (%) Equity-adjusted weight (%)
Bottom 20 30
Second 20 25
Middle 20 20
Fourth 20 15
Top 20 10
Total 100 100
Figure 2 U5MR by quintile – different scenarios
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implies that most of the gains accrue to the
upper quintiles. The gradient across quintiles
becomes markedly steeper than in the baseline
year. Second, the medium-equity scenario
reduces U5MR by 30 points for all quintiles. The
gradient across quintiles remains the same as in
the baseline year. Third, the high-equity scenario
equalises the U5MR for all quintiles to 70;
implying that the lowest quintiles benefit the
most. The gradient across quintiles disappears.
Under each of the three scenarios, the quintiles
face very different realities, yet this is not
captured by the national U5MR statistic. The
U5MR for the bottom quintile ranges from 120
to 70; that for the top quintile varies between 70
and 20. Nonetheless, the un-adjusted national
U5MR statistic is the same under the three
scenarios, namely 70. Thus, it cannot be known
from the national statistic how equitable
progress has been.
By using equity-adjusted weights, however, the
national U5MR statistic will indicate whether
progress is distributed equitably or not. The
more equitable the pattern of progress, the
better the national statistic becomes. By
applying the equity-adjusted weights given in
Table 1, the low-equity scenario yields a national
U5MR statistic of 83. This is about one-fifth
higher than that for the high-equity scenario.
The medium-equity scenario results in a national
U5MR value of 75; as shown in Table 2.
Equity-adjusted weights imply that countries that
follow a low-equity scenario will register a higher
national U5MR value. Hence, their ranking will
be different from the standard ranking.
Six other methods have been considered. First,
the U5MR for the bottom quintile can be used as
summary measure for equitable progress. This is
equivalent to placing the weight of 100 per cent
on the bottom quintile and weights of zero (0) to
the other quintiles. While it is a good Indicator
of the situation of the most disadvantaged, it
fails to capture the disparities within the society
at large. The second method is inspired by the
‘vast majority income approach’ proposed by
Shaikh and Ragab (2007). It is equivalent to
using a weight of zero for the top quintile and a
weight of 25 per cent each for the other
quintiles. This method overlooks the disparities
within the bottom four quintiles. The third
method is the ‘ratio gap’. It measures the ratio
between the top and bottom quintiles and
multiplies the national average by that ratio to
adjust the national U5MR statistic. This method
also fails to capture the intermediate quintiles.
In addition, it yields adjusted U5MR values with
little appeal and intuitive understanding because
they are exceedingly high. The fourth method is
inspired by Paes de Barros (forthcoming) and is
based on ‘excess’ mortality. Excess for each
quintile is calculated as the difference between
the average U5MR and the quintile-specific
U5MR. If the quintile-specific is lower than the
national average, the excess is zero. The sum of
the quintile-specific excesses is added to the
national U5MR value to obtain the adjusted
national statistic. As with the use of the ‘ratio
gap’, most countries see their adjusted U5MR
soar beyond typical levels. This method, while
good at measuring the level of disparity, fails to
capture the pattern of inequity in that it does not
show from which quintiles ‘excess’ originates.
The fifth method calculates the geometric mean
instead of the arithmetic average. The higher the
level of inequity, the lower the geometric mean
will be. However, U5MR is a negative outcome so
that higher inequality should be reflected in a
higher adjusted statistic. This can be fixed by
calculating the difference between the geometric
and arithmetic averages and adding the
difference. However, such conversions obscure the
results and make them less intuitive to
understand. The sixth and final method adjusts
the average U5MR with the concentration index;
akin to Sen’s (1976) approach for income
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Table 2 National U5MR statistics by scenario
Scenario Using un-adjusted weights Using equity-adjusted weights
Low-equity 70 83
Medium-equity 70 75
High-equity 70 70
distribution. It also results in lower U5MR values
for the most iniquitous countries, as the
concentration index takes negative values in the
presence of inequality. Again, this can be solved
by conversions. The concentration index,
however, is relatively small and thus leads to
relatively small changes in the adjusted U5MRs,
even for countries with large disparities.
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the
database with weights of 25 and 35 per cent,
respectively, for the bottom quintile. It shows that
the outcome differs proportionately to the change
in weights. When the difference in weights is
large, the impact on the adjusted U5MR statistic
is large. A small difference in weights does not
really impact significantly on the equity-adjusted
statistic. Thus, adjusted weights that start with
30 per cent for the bottom quintile seem justified.
4.3 Data and analyses
Quintile-specific U5MR estimates are readily
available from DHS sources. Our sample covers
63 countries. Several countries have two or more
surveys, so that a total of 133 observations are
included in our sample.4 The equity-adjusted
U5MR values are compared with the un-adjusted
statistics to assess different equity patterns
across countries and over time.
The difference between the un-adjusted and the
equity-adjusted U5MR values for the 133
observations in the sample averages 8 per cent.
It ranges from 19 per cent in Peru to –0.9 per
cent in Chad.5 The top-ten countries in terms of
disparities include Peru, Bolivia, South Africa,
Egypt, Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the
Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Nicaragua.
As mentioned earlier, Bolivia and Namibia have
the same national U5MR value but with marked
differences in gradients across quintiles. Figure 3
shows that Bolivia sees an increase by 17 per cent
in its U5MR statistic when adjusted for equity,
whereas Namibia’s statistic increases by a mere 3
per cent. The equity-adjusted U5MR for the
former is 10 per cent higher than for the latter.
Bolivia’s entrenched inequality is thus made
explicit from its equity-adjusted national statistic;
something the standard statistic does not reveal.
Of the 63 countries in the sample, 46 have trend
data. Of those, the majority displays either
widening disparities over time or no consistent
trend. Only two countries (Bolivia and Ghana)
show a distinct tendency towards less inequity.
The ranking of countries changes considerably.
About half of the 63 countries in the sample see
a change in their ranking with the equity-
adjusted statistics – up to five places difference.
Proportionately more countries in Latin America
see their ranking worsen than those in sub-
Saharan Africa.
5 Conclusion
This article recommends to hasten slowly in
defining the post-2015 framework. It will be vital
for bilateral and multilateral aid agencies,
international non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and think-tanks not to rush into
defining the successor to the MDGs. Adequate
consultations among the various stakeholders
will be essential for maintaining the current
level of support for a Target-driven approach to
the international development agenda. The
process must be led by the stakeholders from
developing countries.6
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Figure 3 U5MR in Bolivia and Namibia
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The 2010 review must focus on global progress
towards the global Goals. The intergovernmental
discussions on the post-2015 framework should
not start until a UN panel of Eminent Persons
has prepared intelligent and feasible options for
the post-2015 Targets. The worst decision would
be to simply keep the same MDGs and set new
Targets with a new timeline.
Apart from making a strong case for a Target-
driven approach to development, the panel will
have to address the following areas: (a) new
structure; (b) new Targets; (c) collective nature
of global Targets; (d) type of benchmarks;
(e) new time horizon; and (f) disaggregated
monitoring.
Reducing disparities within countries emerges as
the critical condition for meeting the MDGs by
2015. Given the increased availability of
disaggregated data it is now feasible to adjust
key national statistics to reflect disparities within
countries. The article proposes a straightforward
method for embedding equity into national
statistics on key dimensions of human
development. The resulting change in the
ranking of countries is likely to trigger a much
needed focus on disparities.
The method is meant to keep watch over equity
trends. It is likely to be criticised by mainstream
statisticians and economists alike. Without
dismissing the statistical caveats involved, league
tables do catch the eye of political leaders. They
have prompted local and global action in the
pursuit of pro-poor outcomes. Such action will be
vital for ensuring a future for the MDGs, or
whatever they will be called beyond 2015.
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Notes
1 It reportedly took the author longer to write
the 36-page monograph Good to Great and the
Social Sectors (Collins 2005) than it did to write
his 300-page bestseller Good to Great: Why Some
Companies Make the Leap … and Others Don’t
(Collins 2001).
2 A term mentioned by Harford (2009: 60).
3 Equity-adjusted weights will differ by
Indicator. The un-adjusted weights of 20 per
cent per quintile for U5MR would assume
that the fertility rate is uniform across
quintiles. In reality, families in the lower
quintiles tend to have more children so that
their share in the under-five population will
exceed 20 per cent. Hence, weights that
adjust for equity will have to be Indicator-
specific.
4 Data are available from the authors upon
request (jan.vandemoortele@gmail.com).
5 The sole observation in the sample that does
not show a downward sloping gradient in
U5MR by wealth groups is Chad (2004).
Between 1996 and 2004, the U5MR increased
for the bottom and top quintiles, whereas it
decreased for the other quintiles.
6 ‘Les solutions, il va falloir les chercher ensemble.
Sinon, on s’épuisera à prévoir des aides aux pays en
voie de développement’ [The solutions will have to
be sought together. If not, we will exhaust
ourselves providing aid to poor countries]
(Abbé Pierre 1994: 170).
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